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ST AUGUSTINE AND THE PROBLEM OF
DECEPTION IN RELIGIOUS PERSUASION
A substantial body of literature has been produced in the twentieth century
by religious and philosophical writers on the ethics of belief. Discussion of
this topic has generally focused on the processes leading up to belief within
the individual, so that it would not be inaccurate to say that for most of these
writers 'the ethics of belief means 'the ethics of coming-to-believe'.1 There
has been little attention among these writers, however, to the moral questions
which surround the production or inducement of beliefs in others, to the
ethics of persuasion. An extension of the ethics of belief to cover moral issues
which arise in connection with persuasion seems reasonable; the ethics of
belief, widely construed, might be said to encompass questions about both
the production of beliefs within oneself and the inducement of beliefs in
others.
While the subject of persuasion has been neglected by twentieth century
religious and philosophical writers concerned with the ethics of belief, there
has been a long history of interest in the ethics of persuasion among rhetorical
theorists, an interest first expressed by Socrates and Plato and culminating
in the twentieth century in a large number of articles appearing in
speech-communication journals on the ethics of rhetoric.2
1
 The point of departure for most of the twentieth-century literature on the ethics of belief is William
James' essay, 'The Will to Believe', in 'The Will to Believe' and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897;
rpt. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). Important recent treatments include Robert
R. Ammerman, 'Ethics and Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S. LXV (1969), 41-58; Richard
M. Gale, 'William James and the Ethics of Belief, American Philosophical Quarterly, xvu (1980), 1-14; Van
A. Harvey, 'Is There an Ethics of Belief?', Journal of Religion, XLIX (1969), 41-58, and 'The Ethics of
Belief Reconsidered', Journal of Religion, u x (1979), 406-20; Jack W. Meiland, 'What Ought We to
Believe? or The Ethics of Belief Revisited', American Philosophical Quarterly, xvn (1980), I5-24;H. H. Price,
' Belief and Will', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. xxvm (1954), 1-26; and Bernard Williams,
'Deciding to Believe', in Language, Belief, and Metaphysics, eds. H. E. Kiefer and Milton Munitz (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1970).
2
 Among the more significant contributions to the recent literature are B. J. Diggs, 'Persuasion and
Ethics', Quarterly Journal of Speech, L (1964), 359-73; Richard L. Johannesen, 'Richard M. Weaver on
Standards for Ethical Rhetoric', Central States Speech Journal, xxix (1978), 127-37; Christopher
L. Johnstone, 'An Aristotelian Trilogy: Ethics, Rhetoric, Politics, and the Search for Moral Truth',
Philosophy and Rhetoric, XIII (1980), 1-24; Richard Murphy, 'Preface to an Ethic of Rhetoric', in The
Rhetorical Idiom: Essays in Rhetoric, Oratory, Language and Drama, ed. Donald C. Bryant (NY: Russell and
Russell, 1966); William Schrier, 'The Ethics of Persuasion', Quarterly Journal of Speech, xvi (1930), 476-86;
and Richard M. Weaver, 'A Responsible Rhetoric', Intercollegiate Review, xn (1976-7), 81-7. For further
references, see F. J . Antczak and A. Brinton, 'The Ethics of Rhetoric: A Bibliography', Rhetoric Society
Quarterly, xi (1981), 187-90.
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The ethics of belief, whether construed narrowly or taken in the wider sense
suggested above, is of special interest with respect to religious beliefs. In this
essay, I would like to deal with one of the central problems for the ethics
of religious persuasion, primarily through an examination of views expressed
by St Augustine. Augustine's formal education was in rhetorical theory, and
he was himself a teacher of rhetoric. Book iv of his De Doctrina Christiana is
his own formal written treatment of the subject. There are four ethical
problems for religious persuaders which are either explicitly addressed or
suggested by what is said in De Doctrina. (1) Are techniques of persuasion
(for example, the devices of classical rhetoric) appropriate at all in communi-
cating religious truth and attempting to bring others to religious belief? (2)
Do appeals to emotion have a legitimate role to play in religious persuasion?
If so, what is that role? (3) Is it wrong for the religious persuader to aim to
please or entertain hearers? (In other words, what role if any should pleasure
play in religious persuasion?) and (4) Is 'personal salvation' or the eternal
good of the soul an end of such transcending importance as to justify the use
of deceptive means in religious persuasion?
It is the fourth of these problems, a problem about means and ends, which
is the subject of the present essay; so I will report only briefly what Augustine
has to say on the other three. There might be some doubt about whether
the first of these four problems is really an ethical problem. But for Augustine,
and within the context of classical rhetorical theory, it must be so regarded,
since it has to do with the duties of the religious speaker or communicator:
What efforts is it the responsibility of the religious speaker to exert? Within
the framework of Augustine's Christianity, religious belief is from the human
point of view a matter of individual choice and from the divine point of view
a matter of the action of the Holy Spirit. Should religious speaking, then,
aim to persuade at all? Or should it simply involve a presentation of religious
truth? In other words, should religious speaking just be a matter of
proclamation? Early in Book iv of De Doctrina, Augustine defends the use of
rhetorical skills and devices by the Christian orator on the grounds that there
is nothing inherently objectionable about the tools of rhetoric, since they may
be used for either good or evil. Indeed, his view seems to be that their natural
and highest use is to promote belief in the highest truths. 'Since by means
of the art of rhetoric both truth and falsehood are urged,' he asks, 'who would
dare to say that truth should stand in the person of its defenders unarmed
against lying?... While the faculty of eloquence, which is of great value in
urging either evil or justice, is in itself indifferent, why should it not be
obtained for the uses of the good in the service of truth if the evil usurp it
for the winning of perverse and vain causes in defence of iniquity and error? n
In Book iv of De Doctrina, it has been argued, Augustine is coming to terms
1
 On Christian Doctrine, trans. D. W. Robertson, J r (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958); all references
here are to this edition.
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S003441250001547X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 11 Feb 2017 at 04:59:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
ST AUGUSTINE AND DECEPTION IN PERSUASION 439
with his own classical education in rhetoric. An analogous problem, about
the use of principles and precepts in the interpretation of religious doctrine
(which is the subject of the other three books of De Doctrina), is dealt with
in the Prologue.1
The problems of emotion and pleasure are really, at least in part, more
specific elaborations of the first problem, since pleasure and emotion are
among the intended effects in the use of rhetorical devices. Augustine raises
these two issues in connection with Cicero's three 'ends' of rhetoric: to teach
(docere), to delight (delectare), and to move (Jlectere).2 Speaking of the second
and third of these ends, Augustine says 'Just as [the hearer] is delighted if
you speak sweetly, so is he persuaded (flectitur) if he loves what you promise,
fears what you threaten, hates what you condemn, embraces what you
commend, sorrows at what you maintain to be sorrowful; rejoices when you
announce something delightful, places pity on those whom you place before
him in speaking as being pitiful, flees those whom you, moving fear, warn
are to be avoided; and is moved by whatever else may be done through grand
eloquence toward moving the minds of listeners' (pp. 136—7). Emotion has
often been regarded as a problem in the ethics of belief and in the ethics of
rhetoric because it seems often, as Plato complained, to interfere with
reasoning. There is no indication in De Doctrina that Augustine thinks that
emotion has any legitimate role to play in the formation of belief. The
ultimate end of rhetoric for Augustine, however, is to change hearers and
move them to action. Sometimes belief by itself will be enough to effect these
changes; but when it will not, eloquent appeals to the emotions may be
required: 'When it is necessary, it is to be done, and it is necessary when
they know what should be done but do not do it ' (p. 137).
Pleasure has sometimes been regarded as problematic in rhetoric when the
aim is to entertain or flatter hearers rather than to improve them or move
them to necessary courses of action. It presents a special problem for
Augustine, since he holds that one ought not to take pleasure in anything
for its own sake, except those things which are eternal and immutable.3 But
he justifies the pleasing of hearers in Chapters 12-14 of Book iv on the
grounds that it is needed by religious speakers to get and keep the attention
of their hearers.
There is a conception of rhetoric which has its origins in Socrates and Plato;
which threads its way through the writings of a number of important classical
1
 For an insightful discussion of Augustine's intentions in writing Bk. iv of De Doctrina, see James
J. Murphy, 'St. Augustine and the Debate about a Christian Rhetoric', Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI
(i960), 400-10.
2
 For the Latin text of Bk. rv, with commentary, see A. Aurelii Augustini, De Doctrina Cristiana liber
quartus, trans. Sister Therese Sullivan, Catholic Univ. Patristic Studies, vol. xxm (Washington, D.C.:
193°)-
3
 Book 1, Ch. xxii. For an even more austere account of the role of pleasure in rhetoric, see Francois
Fenelon, Dialogues on Eloquence, trans. Wilbur S. Howell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951),
which originally appeared in 1717.
16-2
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rhetoricians; and which seems particularly suited to religious persuasion, at
least within the Christian tradition. This conception arose partly out of
ethical concerns, and it gives rise to at least two fundamental principles of
ethical persuasion. It will be worth our while to take a brief but careful look
at it before dealing with Augustine's fourth problem, since some attention
to it will help us to appreciate more fully the nature of that problem, and
since Augustine seems to be influenced by this conception.
Plato has often been regarded as an enemy of rhetoric on account of his
attacks on the Sophists, especially for his criticisms in the two dialogues which
are explicitly about rhetoric, the Gorgias and the Phaedrus. A central question
in the Gorgias is whether rhetoric is truly an art {techne) as Gorgias claims it to
be. When Gorgias and Socrates speak of rhetoric, they are both concerned
with the persuasive use of discourse (as is Augustine). Gorgias, like most
Greek and Roman rhetoricians, is thinking more exclusively than Socrates
in terms of public speaking. But they agree that rhetoric has to do with verbal
persuasion. Socrates seems in the Gorgias and elsewhere to have two main
reasons, in addition to the inability of rhetoricians to explain the nature of
their activity, for thinking that rhetoric as he knows it to have been practiced
is not an art. One reason is that its proponents do not know or emphasize
their subject-matter and are concerned with appearances rather than reality.
The other reason is that in practicing rhetoric Gorgias and others do not aim
to benefit and improve their hearers; they aim instead at their own benefit.
It is Plato's view that a genuine techne has by definition a telos, an end at which
it aims, which is the improvement and well-being of that on which it
operates; the Sophistic rhetoricians, however, aim at their own enrichment,
and only flatter and entertain their hearers.
These criticisms - that rhetoricians fail to take their subject-matter
seriously and that they show little concern for the well-being of their hearers
- emerge at two stages in the Gorgias: in the initial exchange between Socrates
and Gorgias, and in the well-known comparison between rhetoric and
cookery in Socrates' discussion with Polus. The problem about subject-matter
arises when Gorgias claims at 452 that the skilled orator will be more
persuasive, even on a subject on which he is relatively ignorant, than the
expert, and that rhetoric is the greatest of goods since it gives its practitioners
freedom to do as they please and power over others. All the orator has to
do is manage appearances, so that real knowledge is unnecessary. Gorgias
anticipates moral objections about the uses of rhetoric by arguing that it is
simply a set of skills, a neutral tool which may be used for either good or
evil ends. The view expressed here by Gorgias, which we may refer to as ' the
instrumental view of rhetoric', is characteristic of Sophistic rhetoric and
pervades much of classical rhetorical theory. Plato not only regards the
instrumental view as morally objectionable; he also refuses to dignify the
mere mastery of skills by regarding it as a techne.
Both of Plato's criticisms of Sophistic rhetoric are made strongly in the
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comparison between rhetoric and cookery at 462 D ff. Cookery simulates
what medicine does. One of the concerns of the art of medicine is to determine
which foods are good for the human body and under what circumstances
— in other words, medicine is concerned with nutrition. So the physician takes
an interest in various kinds of foods and the effects they have on the body;
and, by definition, medicine aims at making and keeping the body healthy.
Cookery, on the other hand, is concerned with making food seem good. It
is a form of'flattery' (of the food); it adorns food, makes it attractive. And
it aims to delight the eater, producing pleasure in the body rather than
improving and maintaining it. As cookery is to the body, so Sophistic rhetoric
is to the soul. It is concerned with the appearance of its subject-matter rather
than with its true nature, and its only concern with hearers is that they be
persuaded, usually for the benefit of the persuader.
Had Plato gone no further than these criticisms, he might truly be said
to be an enemy of rhetoric, although there are already in his criticisms hints
of what a true techne of rhetoric would be. In the Gorgias, Socrates eventually
suggests the possibility of a 'right sort of rhetorician', one who is really 'just
and well-informed of the ways of justice', and the context indicates that such
a rhetorician would be concerned with improving souls.1 But Plato goes much
further in the Phaedrus. After criticizing sample speeches, Socrates says that
there is no shame in writing or delivering speeches: 'The disgrace', he says,
'consists in speaking or writing not well, but disgracefully and badly' (258D).
'Speaking well,' as the notion is developed in the Phaedrus, will qualify as a
techne, since it is based upon the appropriate sorts of knowledge and since it
aims at the improvement of souls. Two sorts of knowledge essential to
speaking well are emphasized in the Phaedrus: knowledge of the ' truth of the
matters' about which the orator is to speak (259E), and knowledge of the
nature of the soul. The true orator will understand the nature of souls partly
from a desire to improve them through the practice of the true art of rhetoric.
As Richard Weavers points out in his analysis of the Phaedrus, it is no accident
that the sample speeches are about eros; since, according to the conception
of eros developed by Plato in the Phaedrus and the Symposium, the true lover
aims at improving the soul of the beloved.2
In his defence of the use of rhetorical skills by religious persuaders,
Augustine appears perhaps to endorse an intrumental view of rhetoric, since
he says that it is in itself'indifferent' (in medio posita). But this is, I think,
only an appearance.3 However, even if Augustine does view rhetoric in
1
 508c, trans. W. R. M. Lamb in the Loeb Classical Library (1925; rpt. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1975). Further references to Plato, as here, will be by Stephanus page numbers.
References to the Phaedrus are to the H. N. Fowler translation, also in the Loeb Classical Library (1914;
rpt. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).
* Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (South Bend, Indiana: Regnery/Gateway, 1953), chap,
i.
3
 While Augustine does hold that rhetorical skills may be turned to either good or evil purposes, there
are good reasons for thinking that his commitment to the instrumental view is only apparent. The passage
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general as neutral, it is clear that he views religious rhetoric in teleological
terms, as aiming by its very nature to benefit hearers. So, at the very least,
religious rhetoric is for Augustine what the true art of rhetoric is for Plato.
Plato's conception of rhetoric is motivated by ethical considerations as well
as by his view of the true nature oitechne, and it suggests two norms for ethical
persuasion which are particularly applicable in religious contexts: (i) that
responsible persuasion involves a genuine concern for subject-matter, for the
'message' in persuasion, and (2) that responsible persuasion involves a
genuine concern for the character and well-being of the person being
persuaded. Both of these principles will be important in our discussion of the
problem of deception in religious persuasion. Religious rhetoric for Augustine
aims to influence hearers toward a commitment to religious truth in order
to secure the eternal well-being of their souls. The emphasis on the eternal
good of hearers as a teleos is, of course, the source of the difficulty about means
and ends. And we may anticipate that the emphasis on a commitment to
subject-matter will be for Augustine part of the solution to that difficulty.
The question of ends and means is perhaps the thorniest of ethical problems
in religious persuasion. Let us begin by putting the difficulty in the barest
and crudest of terms. Suppose that one small deception will make the
difference: that without it a soul will go down in unbelief into eternal
torments, while with it that same soul will go off into eternal bliss. Suppose
even that the deception is a sin, a punishable offence. Are not little
deceptions, thoughtless little deceptions, common enough already in our
daily lives, and for much less noble purposes? Could the consequences, for
the persuader, of some small well-intended sin possibly outweigh the prospect
of eternal punishment for the potential convert? Or, even supposing the
harshest of penalties for the deceiver, would not the deception in question
be the noblest of personal sacrifices?
Many religious people still have, as Augustine had, such conceptions of
the consequences of belief and nonbelief. For them the problem at hand is
most intense. But for those who reject such conceptions but maintain that
religious belief is the means to achieving the highest good for human beings,
there is an essentially similar problem. If the highest of goods is to be attained
through belief, and if belief will come only through deception, is it not at
least excusable for the religious persuader to set aside scruples about accuracy
and full truthfulness on appropriate occasions?
So baldly stated, the case for deception in religious persuasion seems
obviously perverse. At the same time, many actual religious persuaders .
itself suggests that he believes that the natural use of rhetoric is to promote truth, and that its use to
promote false belief is a perversion, a usurpation. As is well known, Augustine holds that evil is a privation,
involving the absence of something which ought to be present or the distortion of things which are in
themselves good. In De Magistro, he expresses the view that the natural end of human language and
communication is to communicate the truth. The highest end of rhetoric, then, will be to promote the
highest of truths.
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apparently find its logic irresistible. This is not to say that deceptive religious
persuaders typically run consciously through such a line of reasoning before
bending the truth; but at least while they are in the process of persuading,
many religious persuaders are in fact moved to compromise the truth, and
occasionally to tell lies, by the importance of the end which they have in view,
the eternal (or even the temporal) well-being of the persons they aim to
persuade.
The problem of the legitimacy or the usefulness of deception in religious
persuasion is not explicitly raised in De Doctrina, although that book does
include some comments on lying. The issue is raised, however, in De Mendacio
and in Contra Mendacium.1 These two books deal with the general question,
'Ought one ever to tell a lie?' Our concern is in one respect wider than
Augustine's and in another respect narrower. It is wider in that we are
interested here in distortions of the truth in general, and not just in lies. It
is narrower in that it is just in the context of religious persuasion that we
will be concerned about deception. It will be an advantage to arguments
against the use of deception in religious persuasion if they are independent
of the answer to Augustine's general question. He himself ends up arguing
that one ought never to lie. On the other hand, Augustine takes this position
with some hesitation; but then he argues that even if there are some cases
in which a lie is excusable one must never lie on matters of Christian doctrine.
In his two books on lying, Augustine identifies a variety of kinds of cases
in which a lie might be thought to be morally acceptable. The kind of case
which concerns us is one in which the eternal well-being of a soul is at stake.
He considers three such cases as examples. Two of these cases are brought
up in Chapter 11 of De Mendacio, when Augustine suggests that some may
think it right to lie on behalf of another person ' that he may live the while,
or not be offended in those things which he much loveth, to the end that
he may attain unto eternal truth by being taught' (p. 463). The third case
is raised in Contra Mendacium:
But sometimes a peril to eternal salvation is put forth against us; which peril, they
cry out, we by telling a lie, if otherwise it cannot be, must ward off. As, for instance,
if a person who is to be baptized be in the power of impious and infidel men, and
cannot be got at that he may be washed with the laver of regeneration, but by
deceiving his keepers with a lie. From this most invidious cry, by which we are
compelled, not for a man's wealth or honors in this world which are fleeting by, not
for the life itself of this present time, but for the eternal salvation of a human being,
to tell a lie, whither shall I betake me for refuge but unto thee, O truth? (p. 499)
There is a fourth case which provided the occasion for the writing of Contra
Mendacium. The book was written by Augustine in order to dissuade his friend
1
 Both works are translated by the Rev. H. Browne in The Niceru and Post-Niceru Fathers of the Christian
Church, ed. Philip Schaff (1887; rpt. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1976), vol. m. The comments
on lying in De Doctrina are in chapter xxxvi of Bk. i; Augustine admits there, as elsewhere in his writings,
that a person may benefit from being deceived.
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Consentius from using deception to infiltrate the Priscillianist heresy. Among
the doctrines of the Priscillianists, ironically, was the view that religious lies
are sometimes not only acceptable, but commendable. Consentius and some
other Catholics were pretending to accept Priscillianist teachings which they
actually rejected, in order to infiltrate and expose the heretics. One gathers
from Augustine's discussion that one of the justifications for using this tactic
must have been that some of the exposed heretics would eventually come to
saving belief.
So we have four cases: (i) lying to preserve someone's life, in the hope of
later conversion; (2) lying to keep a potential convert from being offended
and thus turned away from the saving truth; (3) lying to free a man from
captors, so that he may receive saving baptism; and (4) lying in order to
infiltrate the camp of heretics, in the hope that they will eventually be
converted.
In dealing with the first two cases, in Chapter 11 of De Mendacio, Augustine
gives two arguments against lying. I will call these 'the adultery argument'
and 'the authority argument'. The adultery argument is an example of what
is sometimes called 'an argument by logical analogy'. The advocate of such
lies does not understand, says Augustine, 'that there is no flagitious thing
which he may not upon the same grounds be compelled to commit' (p. 463).
This is a favourite argument of Augustine's in both of his books on lying;
I call it 'the adultery argument' because his favourite analogy with lying
as a means is adultery or lewdness as a means. It is the sole argument which
he gives in discussing case (3) in Contra Mendacium: 'For why, if those keepers
may be enticed to admit us to baptize the man, by our committing lewdness,
do we refuse to do things contrary to chastity, and yet, if by a lie they may
be deceived, consent to do things contrary to truth ?' (p. 499). If the salvation
of an eternal soul as an end will justify lying as a means, Augustine argues,
then it will justify adultery or anything else that might conceivably serve the
same end. That adultery or lewdness could be justifiable under any
circumstances seems to Augustine to be utterly out of the question.
The essence of the authority argument is expressed in Augustine's
objection that by lying in cases (1) or (2) 'the authority of the doctrine itself
is cut off and altogether undone' (p. 463). There are, however, two different
senses in which this might be taken, and so two different versions of the
authority argument. We shall return to it and them shortly.
Notice that the first and third of our four examples involve lying to
someone other than the potential convert, and that neither is likely to involve
the deceptive manipulation of religious subject-matter (although either
might). Lying to save someone's life or to free someone from captors is not
likely to either involve or be a part of religious persuasion. These two cases
are essentially like the case of lying to save someone's life under more ordinary
circumstances (which Augustine discusses in some detail in both books on
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lying). It is as if the Devil came steaming up to us in pursuit of some soul
and asked 'Which way did it go?' The objection to lying in such cases will
be a general objection to lying as a means. The adultery argument is just
such a general objection. It is not an objection which applies especially to
the context of religious persuasion. It is an objection to ever using lying as
a means to any end, no matter how important. And it is an objection which
is unlikely to convince those who can imagine circumstances in which they
would feel justified in lying to save a human life. Their instincts about
committing adultery to save an eternal soul are likely to be the same, if they
can really conceive of circumstances in which such an option would arise.
The authority argument, unlike the adultery argument, is more specifically
an objection to deception in persuasion, especially to deception in religious
persuasion. Cases (2) and (4), the lie to avoid offending potential converts
and the lie to infiltrate the camp of heretics, are more typical instances of
deception as a part of religious persuasion. Case (4), as it arises for Augustine
in connection with attempts by Consentius to expose the Priscillianist
heretics, is peculiar. But it is an instance of a common phenomenon in
religious persuasion: the persuader feigns common interests or associations
or beliefs with nonbelievers, or otherwise approaches them by means of
deception, in order to get among them and obtain a favourable hearing. For
example, a religious worker on a campus pretends to be a student, or a church
member on door to door visitation claims to be merely taking an opinion
poll, or a religious speaker pretends to share religious or other beliefs with
an audience. Case (4), then, may be taken as a peculiar representative of
a more common tactic: making use of deception in order to get a hearing.
So taken, it is essentially like case (2), which involves the use of deception
in order to avoid losing a favourable hearing. It is characteristic of the ancient
rhetoric handbooks, with which Augustine was no doubt familiar, that they
recommend the use of various techniques, some involving deception, to make
audiences receptive.1 It is likely that in discussing case (2) Augustine has such
recommendations in mind. The discussion of the role of delighting in De
Doctrina makes it clear that Augustine does not object to efforts to make
audiences receptive; but he does object to the use of deception for that
purpose.
Cases (2) and (4) are instances of what we may call 'external' deception;
they are preparatory or attendant to the presentation of the religious
message. They may or may not involve misrepresentation of religious
subject-matter or doctrine. Their aim is to create and maintain a favourable
context for persuasive argumentation. 'Internal' deception in religious
1
 See, for instance, the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, trans. H. Rackham, in the Loeb Classical Library (1937;
rpt. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), chs. 29-34; a n ^ the Rhetorica adHerennium, trans.
Harry Caplan, also in the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954),
Bk. 1, ch. vi. There is also some discussion of such techniques in Aristotle's Art of Rhetoric, trans. J. H. Freese,
Loeb Classical Library (1926; rpt. Cambridge, 1975), Bk. in, chs. 14 ff.
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persuasion, on the other hand, will be a matter of what goes on within the
process of persuasive argumentation itself; and it will involve distortion or
misrepresentation of the religious subject-matter itself, either in its content
or in its supports. Since the distinction between the context of argumentation
and argumentation itself is relative, the distinction between external and
internal deception will not be absolute. The two will tend to merge into one
another, and there will be borderline cases. But the main difference is that
external deception need not involve deceptive handling of religious subject-
matter; and, when it does, the misrepresentations are more superficial.
Internal deception, on the other hand, essentially operates with the subject-
matter, and it involves the deceptive manipulation of the very processes by
which the persuaded will come to belief. The typical devices of internal
deception are the familiar 'tricks of dishonest argument', such as the
intentional use of equivocations, various forms of begging the question, the
use of ridicule or other diversionary tactics to evade serious objections,
outright falsification or misrepresentation of evidence, ad hominem attacks on
opponents, and distortion of opposing points of view (for example, fastening
on and magnifying some trivial aspect of the opponent's position). These sorts
of tactics are employed in essentially the same ways in religious persuasion
as they are elsewhere; they have been widely discussed in logic books and
need no special treatment in connection with the religious context.
Let us return now to the authority argument. There are, as I mentioned
earlier, two senses in which the 'authority of doctrine' might be 'cut off and
undone', and thus there are two different versions or levels of the authority
argument. It is the first of these two senses which seems to be most directly
applicable to external cases such as case (2), and which is emphasized in
Augustine's formulation of the argument in Chapter 11 of De Mendacio: the
credibility of the messenger will be undermined by lying. ' How can there
be any believing one who thinks it is sometimes right to lie?' Augustine asks.
The credibility argument, while mainly pragmatic rather than moral, is not
to be taken lightly and is not without moral import. Augustine appeals to
it on several occasions in both De Mendacio and Contra Mendacium. Although
we are looking for arguments which will not depend upon or entail the claim
that every lie is wrong, it must at least be allowed that there is a moral
presumption against lying. Any moral justification for deception in religious
persuasion in terms of the importance of ends will have to overcome that
presumption and is likely to depend upon pragmatic considerations, upon
the potential effectiveness of deception as a means. The religious persuader,
like the secular orator dealing with questions of morality, must have a special
concern with credibility and with appearances. Such a persuader is not likely
to be effective without at least the appearance of a deep commitment to truth
and truthfulness. According to several of Augustine's important predecessors
in rhetorical theory (especially Isocrates and Quintilian), such an appearance
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is unlikely if not impossible unless the commitment is actual. Augustine
himself stresses the character and reputation of the Christian orator in the
last few chapters of De Doctrina; and it seems clear that moral uprightness
and truthfulness, are, for Augustine, not only important for effectiveness, but
are also fitting for the bearer of such a message.
The second and more important sense in which Augustine thinks that the
authority of the doctrine might be ' undone' is that the religious message itself
might be corrupted by deception. Let us call the second version of the
authority argument' the integrity argument'. It is the integrity of the subject-
matter, rather than that of the persuader, which is the issue in the integrity
argument. The message itself is corrupted when the religious subject-matter
is manipulated deceptively. Falsifications or distortions involving religious
doctrine are, for Augustine, the most deplorable of deceptions. While there
is room for discussion about other sorts of lies, under no circumstances
whatever are lies to be told on matters of religious doctrine. In Chapter 25
of De Mendacio, Augustine says ' first to be eschewed is that capital lie and
far to be fled from, which is done in the doctrine of religion; to which lie
a man ought by no consideration to be induced'. He says the same in Chapter
37 and then in Chapter 42 says 'There must therefore be no lying in the
doctrine of piety: it is a heinous wickedness, and the first sort of detestable
lie.' Even 'unto eternal salvation', he adds, 'none is to be led by aid of a
lie'.
The argument in support of these condemnations is given most explicitly
in Chapter 40 of De Mendacium, in which Augustine is making a comparison
between 'pudicity of body, and chastity of soul, and verity of doctrine', the
last of which he judges to be most important. 'Verity of doctrine, of religion
and piety', he argues, 'is not violated unless by a lie.' Piety in this life he
sees as grounded in doctrine and truth, 'which by lying is possible to be
corrupted' and ' is most of all to be kept incorrupt'. There is the unmistakable
implication in Augustine's pronouncements that doctrinal truth is more
important than the eternal destiny of particular human souls. So his
commitment to the first of Plato's emphases (subject-matter) is deeper than
his commitment to the second (well-being of hearers).
There is another brief but interesting line of argument in Contra Mendacio
which involves the emphasis on subject-matter and which is related to
Augustine's view of the nature and function of language. At the beginning
of that book, Augustine suggests that there is a sort of inconsistency in using
lies to expose the false doctrines of heretics and to promote the truth. Then,
near the end of the book there is an attempt to develop this suggestion into
an argument:
How does lying take into itself truth as its patroness? Or, is it for her own adversary
that she conquers, that by herself she may be conquered? Who can bear this
absurdity? In no wise therefore may we say, that they who assert that it is sometimes
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right to lie, in asserting that are truthful; lest, what is most absurd and foolish to
believe, truth should teach us to be liars But then if this thing truth teaches not,
it is not true; if not true, it is not meet to be learned; if not meet to be learned, never
therefore is it meet to tell a lie. (Chap. 38)
Augustine holds, then, that there is an incoherence of some kind in thinking
that lies can serve the truth or that the truth can commend lying. The precise
nature of this incoherence is not explained; and, in fact, it is not clear that
there is any logical difficulty in the notion that a lie might do more to
maximize the number of true instances of believing in the world than would
any alternative true utterance. On the other hand, there does seem to be
hypocrisy on the part of the religious persuader who uses lies in the name
of truth; and we shall see shortly that this provides the basis for a more
definite argument against the use of lies, an argument which applies
especially to the context of religious persuasion.
Classical rhetorical theory, especially after the time of Aristotle, typically
thought of rhetorical situations in terms of a division into three elements: (1)
the speaker, (2) the speech or message, and (3) the audience. Plato's ideal
rhetoric, as we saw earlier, places emphasis on the second and third of these
elements, and gives rise to two general obligations for the persuader: a
commitment to the subject-matter and a commitment to the well-being of
hearers. The difficulty about ends and means, as it has been raised here, arises
out of a disproportionate and restricted emphasis on the third of the three
elements and on the second of Plato's two principles. Of the two versions of
the authority argument, we might say that the credibility argument emphasizes
the speaker, mostly in practical term, but with ethical overtones. The role of
the speaker in persuasion is discussed in classical rhetorical theory in terms
of the notion of ethos, which has two senses which correspond to the pragmatic
and moral aspects of the credibility argument: ethos may refer to the
reputation of the speaker, or it may refer to the actual character of the
speaker.1 On the other hand, the integrity argument emphasizes the message.
These are the two main objections which Augustine offers against deception
in religious persuasion. A third main objection, however, one which involves
an emphasis on audience, may be developed within the context of Augustine's
point of view.
Let us call the third main objection to deception in religious persuasion
' the autonomy argument'.2 It has reference to hearers, but with an emphasis
1
 See William M. Sattler, 'Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric', Speech Monographs, XII (1947),
55-65. There are, however, complications, some of which arise from the fact that the ancients were less
inclined than we are to distinguish sharply actual character from reputation, and others of which arise
from etymological considerations. See Thomas E. Corts, 'The Derivation of Ethos', Communication
Monographs, xxxv (1968), 201-2.
2
 The issue of autonomy has been addressed in a more general way by a number of writers on the
ethics of rhetoric. See, for example, Diggs, p. 372; Franklyn S. Haiman, 'A Re-Examination of the Ethics
of Persuasion', Central States Speech Journal, in (1952), 1-9; and Douglas H. Parker, 'Rhetoric, Ethics and
Manipulation', Philosophy and Rhetoric, v (1972), 69-87.
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on their status as autonomous moral and spiritual beings who are entitled
to make their own decisions, rather than an emphasis on their eternal destiny.
This emphasis is analogous to that which the integrity argument places on
the message: just as there ought to be a respect for subject-matter, so there
should be a respect for persons being persuaded. This principle of respect for
the autonomy of hearers has a special significance in religious persuasion, and
particularly within the context of Augustinian Christianity. The nature of
religious faith for Augustine is such that it essentially involves a conscious
decision which is really the individual's own decision. In fact, for Augustine
it is part of the message itself that the individual must consciously make such
a decision, at least this is so from the human point of view.
Now we can see why there is after all a kind of incoherence or inconsistency
in using deception to bring about saving faith. It is not really saving faith
in so far as it is not a matter of the believer's own decision; and it is not the
believer's own decision in so far as it is the work of deception. The ethical
dimension of this for the religious persuader is also clear: the persuader cannot
ethically intend anything less than that the decision for religious faith is
wholly (from the human point of view) the hearer's own autonomous
decision; to intend anything less is inconsistent with a full commitment to the
content of the message itself. The problem of deception in religious persuasion
is, like the appropriateness problem which was discussed earlier, a difficulty
about the role of the persuader. I mentioned earlier that, within the context
of Augustinian Christianity, religious faith is from the divine point of view
a matter of the action of the Holy Spirit and from the human point of view
a matter of individual choice. Augustine argues in De Doctrina that a total
rejection of the use of persuasive devices unduly minimizes the role of the
religious persuader as an instrument in bringing others to belief. The use of
deception, on the other hand, unduly magnifies the role of the persuader:
from the divine point of view it has the persuader usurping the role of the
Holy Spirit, while from the human point of view it has the persuader usurping
the role of the convert. But, since this latter usurpation involves a meddling
in and corrupting of the very processes which are the determiners of belief,
it makes the production of religious faith by deception logically incoherent.1
The centrepiece of an Augustinian ethics of religious persuasion is the
message itself. There are obligations which have to do with the speaker's
character; these arise in part out of pragmatic considerations, but the central
point for Augustine seems to be that there should be a kind of consistency
between the character of the speaker and the content of the message.
1
 This same line of argument will apply within the context of Plato's view of the true art of rhetoric,
in which the 'lover' aims to improve the soul of the 'beloved', since this improvement is to be understood
in terms of the education of the reasoning part of the soul and in terms of the soul's acquiring noesis. The
contrast between deceptive seduction of the soul and its genuine improvement is nicely drawn in the early
pages of Plato's Lysis, in the playful banter between Socrates and Hippothales, who has his sights set on
Lysis.
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Secondly, there are obligations which arise out of the importance of the
subject-matter; it ought not to be corrupted with falsehoods or distortions.
And, thirdly, there are obligations to the person being persuaded; these are
partly a matter of concern for the eternal well-being, but also partly a matter
of the autonomy of the person. We have been concerned chiefly with the
problem of deception; but a good deal of what has been said ought to be
applicable to other ethical problems in religious persuasion.
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